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1 Introduction
It is well known that countries compete for the attraction of footloose multina-
tionals; i.e., mobile multinationals facing a discrete location choice. Moreover,
there is substantial evidence that the sub-national governments role in the
competition for footloose multinationals is becoming more important. This is
apparent in the following citation.
[I]t is also important to incorporate sub-national governments
into the competitive framework. In federal nations and large coun-
tries with decentralised administration it is often sub-national gov-
ernments that deliver incentive packages and contribute most to both
intra-national and international competition (from Charlton (2003),
page 15) ...
[and in page 25] Competition is strong among sub-national gov-
ernments, which often compete more ercely with each other than
with overseas locations.
A similar opinion is expressed in Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006).
For instance, in the United States the incentive competition among states
and cities has increased since the 1960s. Bidding wars for specic plants
have become widespread, with incentive packages escalating in total worth (see
LeRoy 2005 and Chirinko and Wilson 2006). Moreover, since the early 1990s,
the same type of regional competition has begun to proliferate in developing
countries such as Brazil (see Versano, Ferriera, and Afonso 2002), China (see
Xu and Yeh 2005) and India (see Schneider 2004), to mention only a few.
This paper looks at a countys central government optimal policy in a setting
where two of its local regions compete for the attraction of footloose multina-
tionals to their sites and where the considered multinationals strictly prefer this
country to the rest of the world (i.e., the country has some advantage in terms
of strategic location, productivity etc.). Two separate pieces of literature have
looked at problems which are related to the one studied in this paper.
Firstly, there is a branch of literature that, using di¤erent set-ups, models
inter-region (country) competition for footloose multinationals. For example,
Bond and Samuelson (1986) model the fact that the tax competition between
countries takes the form of a tax holiday. Barros and Cabral (2000) analyze
subsidy gamesbetween countries in order to attract foreign direct investment
(FDI) from a third country. Han and Leach (2007) develop a general equilibrium
model in which there is a bidding war among regions for a continuum of rms.
Behrens and Picard (2008) present a model in which governments bid for rms
by taxing/subsidizing setup costs and were the rms choose both the number
and the location of the plants they operate. Borcka and Püger (2006) look at
tax competition in the context of the new economic geography settings. They
nd that if the mobile factor is completely agglomerated in one region, it earns
an agglomeration rent which can be taxed. Closer integration rst results in
a race to the top in taxes before leading to a race to the bottom. Finally,
Hauer and Wooton (2006) consider unilateral and coordinated tax policy in
a union of two regions (A and B) that competes with a foreign potential-host
region (C) for the location of a monopolistic rm. A survey can be found in
Dembour (2003). This literature focuses on horizontal tax competition when
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mobile multinationals face discrete location choices, which is the main feature
shared with our paper. However, unlike in our paper, in this literature there
is no central government intervening in the competition between lower level
jurisdictions.
Secondly, our paper is related to the literature on concurrent taxation,
which looks at the case where several levels of governments independently set
their taxes on a common tax base. The concurrent taxation problem has been
analyzed by the public nance literature in the framework of the standard tax
competition model of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986); see Keen and Kotso-
giannis (2002). Further discussion and references about this problem can be
found in Keen (1998) and Madiès et al. (2004). One di¤erence between the
public nance literature on tax competition and the literature on competition
for foreign direct investment, mentioned in the previous paragraph, is that the
latter deals with markets of imperfect competition while the former usually
assumes perfect competition. A second di¤erence is that in the public nance
literature the inter-jurisdiction competition for rms occurs in a closed economy
setting. Thirdly, in the public nance literature the competition is for capital
rather than for rms facing discrete location choices. Notice that only the second
type of competition allows the implementation of rm-specic policies.
Finally, Parcero (2007) has looked at the concurrent taxation problem in a
setting where two identical local governments bargain with a footloose multina-
tional about the tax to be charged, while the rst-moving central government
of the country has to set the lump sum tax to be paid by the multinational
in each of the two local regions. That paper nds that the central government
asymmetric tax treatment of the two identical regions welfare-dominates the
symmetric one. In other words, it is optimal for the central government to set a
high enough tax in one of the regions (the non-favoured one) in order to increase
the bargaining power of the other (favoured) region, vis-à-vis the multinational.
The present paper is similar to Parcero (2007), but for the sake of reality
it allows more exibility to the local governments at the time of choosing their
policies (incentives) towards footloose multinationals. That is, whether they are
rm-specic or non-rm-specic policies. The e¤ect of this choice on countrys
welfare is assessed.
In reference to the rm-specicitys degrees of the incentives provided by the
states in the U.S., Fisher and Peters (1999) (page 1) writes the following:
One could organize these incentives into ve classes, from the
most specic to the most general:
A. One-time deals negotiated with a specic rm, such as the
property tax exemption . . . or an agreement to nance road access
to a site.
B. Grants and loans provided under programs that receive an-
nual state appropriations, where the rm must apply for funding.
C. Programs that require no explicit funding and that allow a
degree of local government discretion. This would include property
tax abatements in some places (where the abatement is discretionary
or the abatement schedule can vary) . . .
D. Tax incentives for new investment that function as automatic
entitlements: investment tax credits or jobs tax credits under the
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state corporate income tax, and local property tax abatements in
many places.
E. Features of the tax code that apply to every corporation, but
that benet some more than others and that are often advertised by
economic development agencies as reasons to locate in that state.
Examples are single-factor apportionment, exemption of inventories
from property taxation, and exemption of fuel and utilities from the
sales tax.
The previous discussion and quotation suggest that local governments can
choose between a range of policies which di¤er in terms of how much rm-
specic they are. There are many aspects in which rm-specic and non-
rm-specicpolicies may di¤er, though we will only concentrate in one of them
- i.e., how good these policies are in terms of taxing the rents produced by
footloose multinationals.1 Thus, the present paper is about tax competition
and excludes any competition in terms of infrastructure provision or regulation.
As proxies for the rm-specicand the non-rm-specicpolicies we will
use what we call the tax-bargainingand tax-postingregimes respectively. In
the tax posting regime the regional lump-sum taxes2 on the multinationals have
to be set in advance and no tax discrimination can be done between multina-
tionals producing di¤erent levels of rent. On the contrary, in the tax-bargaining
regime each multinational negotiates with the region the particular lump-sum
tax to be paid; hence tax discrimination is the advantage of this regime. As will
be seen later, the advantage of the tax-posting regimeis that by pre-committing
to non-negotiation, it has the potential to provide a higher bargaining power
to the region.3
The following results are found. Firstly, as in Parcero (2007) we nd that
the central government asymmetric tax treatment of the two identical regions
welfare-dominates the symmetric one. Secondly, we nd that under some pa-
rameter constellations, if the tax in the non-favoured region (the region where
the central government tax is higher) is too high, a conict of interests is cre-
ated between the central government of the country (who aims to maximize
the countrys welfare) and the favoured region. That is, the central government
would prefer the favoured region implements the tax-bargaining regime, but this
region nds it optimal to implement the tax-posting regime, which attracts only
the high-rent multinational.
Interestingly, this conict of interests is resolved by reducing the central
government tax in the non-favoured region. Thus, the complete elimination of
the competition coming from the second region is not optimal for the country
(as it would be in Parcero 2007). In other words, some regional tax competition
is desirable and hence the central government tax in the non-favoured region
1For economy of language we will refer to the present value of the rents produced by a
multinational as simply the rent. Moreover, this paper makes the simplifying assumption
that the multinationals do not produce externalities to the host region.
2The use of lump-sum taxes is a convenient simplication.
3The assumption that tax discrimination is not possible under the tax-posting regime is
a simplifying one, because our main results would still apply under a less restrictive one.
Moreover, notice that the fact that bargaining allows a higher price discrimination than a
price-posting is well recognized. For instance, Spier (1990) considers a model with two types
of buyers, di¤ering in their willingness to pay for one unit of a good. Like us, Spier argues
that the advantage for a seller of implementing bargaining is that it o¤ers exibility, whereas
the disadvantage is that more surplus is retained by the buyer; see also Bester (1993).
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should not be too high. The reason for this result is that a certain degree of
competition from the non-favoured region drives the favoured region to adopt
the tax-bargaining regime, which is the optimal one for the country; i.e., the
conict of interests is resolved.
Finally, we also show that the implementation of the regional tax-bargaining
regime weakly welfare dominates the implementation of the regional tax-posting
regime. In the case that our choice of proxies for the policys rm-specicity
degrees were an appropriate simplication of the reality, this result could be used
to refute those criticisms to inter-regional tax competition that are specically
addressed to the regional implementation of rm-specic policies. Hence, the
not infrequent call for the central government to ban this type of regional policies
goes against the advice of this paper. Therefore, if a country had to (and had
the capacity to) restrict the regional ability of policy making in some way, our
paper would advocate the restriction of the non-rm-specic policies, rather
than the rm-specic ones.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The basic model, which consists
of a four stage game, is introduced in section 2. In sections 3, 4 and 5 we
respectively look at the equilibrium of the three sub-games, where the regional
taxes are determined (stages 3 and 4 of the game). At these stages both regions
have already chosen their tax regimes (in stage 2) and they know the central
government tax in each region (set in stage 1). In section 3 we solve the sub-
game where, in stage 2, one region has chosen the tax-bargaining regime and
the other has chosen the tax-posting one (there are two symmetric cases here).
In section 4 we solve the sub-game where, in stage 2, both regions have chosen
the tax-posting regime. In section 5 we solve the sub-game where, in stage 2,
both regions have chosen the tax-bargaining regime. Section 6 solves the rst
stage of the game, where the optimal central government tax in each region has
to be found. The results are analyzed in section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 The basic model
In modelling inter-region tax competition for foreign investment, we follow the
standard assumption that the central government moves rst and commits it-
self to particular lump sum taxes to be paid by the multinationals - it acts as a
Stackelberg leader. Then, at the time of setting the local taxes, the local gov-
ernments take the central government taxes as given. For simplicity we assume
that both levels of governments have perfect commitment capability when post-
ing a tax (i.e., the posted taxes are non-negotiable). It would be more realistic
to assume a limited commitment capability, though, the qualitative predictions
of the paper would not be a¤ected. Moreover, our assumption is common in the
economics literature on price-posting vs. bargaining, where sellers rather than
governments commit to an irrevocable pricing policy. If anything, governments
seem to have better commitment tools than private sellers.
We assume a fourth-stage game involving the central government, G, two
local regions, Rj for j 2 (1; 2), and amultinational, Mi,4 where i 2 (l; h) is
the multinationals type. Mh and Ml show up with probabilities q and (1  q)
respectively. In the case Mi locates in Rj it produces a rent vij , with vhj >
vlj > 0. For simplicity we consider identical regions; so the subscript j in vij
4The results of the paper would not be a¤ected by considering more than one multinational.
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will be omitted hereafter. Finally, all players have complete information at the
time of making their decisions.
The sequence of the game is shown in Figure 1. In the rst stage of the
game, in order to maximize the expected countrys welfare, G posts a set of
lump sum taxes, g1 and g2, to be paid by Mi in the case of locating in R1 or
R2 respectively.5 Notice that throughout the whole paper we will dene the
favoured region(non-favoured region) as the region having a lower (higher)
central government tax. Moreover, the favored and non-favored regions will be
indicated with the subscripts 1 and 2 respectively.
In the second, third and fourth stages each region has to take decisions in
order to maximize its own expected payo¤. Thus, in the second stage the two
regions simultaneously choose their local-tax regime   i.e., tax-bargainingor
tax posting. In the third stage, when the chosen tax regimes are publicly ob-
served, the region which has chosen the tax postingregime (if any) announces
its local tax level; if both regions have chosen the tax posting regime, they
simultaneously announce their local tax levels, t1 and t2. In the forth stage
Mi shows up and chooses whether to locate the production plant in one of the
regions or not to come to the country at all. In the case Mi establishes in a
region it has to pay the central government tax in this region plus the winning
(i.e., host) regiontax. Depending on which tax regime was chosen by the win-
ning region in stage 2, this last tax would be a posted tax or the result of a
bargaining process.
The payo¤s for all the players are realized in the fourth stage of the game.
Clearly, for a region, say R1, to become the winner of Mi it is necessary that6
vi   g1   ti1  max(vi   g2   ti2; 0); (1)
where the zero term comes from Mi participation constraint (for simplicity,
the payo¤ that Mi obtains by investing abroad is normalized to zero). On the
contrary, in the case that vi g2 ti2 < vi g1 ti1 < 0,Mi will not come to the
country. Thus, whenMi shows up, R2 gets an ex-post payo¤ of zero, whileMis
payo¤, R1s ex-post payo¤ and the countrys ex-post welfare are respectively
given by the following three expressions.7
 i = max (vi   g1   ti1; 0) (2)
5Notice that, as in Parcero (2007), when the taxes are posted the tax poster (central
and/or local government) cannot tax discriminate between the two types of Mis. This
can be justied if Mi type is non-veriable, which ultimately means that a tax-posting regime
conditional on types is unfeasible because it cannot be enforced in a court of law. Consequently,
the central government can only set taxes conditional on the region where Mi builds the new
plant, but not on Mis type.
6Notice that, to be the favored region does not necessarily mean to be the winning
region of Mi 8i 2 (l; h). Also notice that we are using a weak inequality in (1). However,
when the equal sign applies it is not clear who is the winner of Mi. For instance when
vi   g1   ti1 = vi   g2   ti2 > 0, Mi is indi¤erent between the two regions. Thus, when
necessary we will use specic tide break rules to make it clear which region is the winning one.
7For simplicity, we are assuming that the regions do not consider the central government tax
revenue in their own payo¤ functions. Obviously, this is not necessarily a realistic assumption
if the way the central government spends this tax revenue results in higher benets for the
competing regions. However, one justication for assuming that, can be the existence of a large
number of regions in the country. This is because each region would get negligible benets
from this central government tax revenue. Indeed, the central government could expend this
tax revenue in a way that only increases the welfare of the regions that are not participating
in the competition for Mi.
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i1 =

ti1 if vi   g1   ti1  0
0 if vi   g1   ti1 < 0 ; (3)
wi =

ti1 + g1 if vi   g1   ti1  0
0 if vi   g1   ti1 < 0 : (4)
The subscript i in ti1 contemplates the fact that, under the tax-bargaining
regime, the local tax paid by Mi depends on its type. The calculation of the
expected regional payo¤s and expected countrys welfare are straightforward
from (3) and (4), given that we know that the probabilities of Mh and Ml
showing up are q and (1  q).
In order to get the results mentioned in the introduction it is necessary to
nd the expected countrys welfare and expected regional payo¤s under di¤erent
values of the set (g1; g2) (rst stage of the game). However, we rst need to nd
out whether the regions choose the tax-bargaining regime or the tax posting
one (second stage) as well as their equilibrium taxes and payo¤s (third and/or
fourth stages). There are three possible sub-games:
Sub-game (b; p) or (b; p): One region is committed to tax-posting while
the other is committed to tax-bargaining.
Sub-game (p; p): Both regions are committed to tax-posting.
Sub-game (b; b): Both regions are committed to tax-bargaining.
We adopt the convention that the rst (second) element of a bracket, say
(p; b) or (p; p), refers to the favoured (non-favoured) region. From the results
obtained in each of these sub-games the equilibrium regional payo¤s are picked
up in order to nd Gs optimal policy in the rst stage.
Let us now take a short look at a case where there appears the aforemen-
tioned conict of interests between G and R1. In particular and as a motivation
let us consider the consequences of G setting g1 = vl and g2 = vh, which will be
discussed in more detail later. In this case R2 cannot lure any Mis type and so
it does not exert any competition to R1. On the one hand, if R1 bargains and
splits the surplus with Mi, it gets nothing if the rm is Mls type and it gets
1 = (vh  vl)=2 if it is Mhs type. In any case both types of rms locate in R1,
so the expected countrys welfare is w = vl + q(vl   vh)=2. On the other hand,
if R1 posts a tax t1 = vh   vl, it gets nothing if the rm is Ml and it gets a
payo¤ 1 = vh   vl if it is Mh. Since posting induces Ml to locate abroad, the
expected countrys welfare is w = qvh. Clearly, R1 prefers to post, but G would
be content to have R1 posting if and only if vl+ q vh vl2  qvh. On the contrary,
G would prefer R1 to bargain if this inequality is not satised. The question
we want to answer is: what is the central governments best policy under the
latter circumstances? Thus, in order to simplify our calculations the following
assumption is made:
Assumption 1: vl + q vh vl2 > qvh , q < 2vlvh+vl .
The main results of this paper appear when the parameter values satisfy
assumption 1. For these parameter values there is a conict of interests between
G and the winning region and, as a consequence, some competition between
the regions is good for the countrys welfare. Assumption 1 simply requires
the parameter values to be such that it will never be optimal for the central
government to set taxes such that the country attracts only Mh. Notice that
from assumption 1 the following lemma can be derived.
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Lemma 1 It will never be optimal for the country to set gj > vl in both regions;
so it must be the case that gj  vl for at least one region j.
This is because, as we have already said, assumption 1 implies that it is not
optimal to only attract Mh. Additionally and in order to limit the analysis to
non-trivial cases the following assumption is also made:
Assumption 2: 0  gj  vh for j 2 f1; 2g.
The following sub-sections characterize the equilibrium regional expected
payo¤s in each of the three sub-games, which are then used in section 6 to
compute the sub-game-perfect equilibrium of the entire game.
3 One region implements the tax-bargaining
regime and the other the tax-posting regime
In this section we look at the sub-game where (at the second stage of the game)
one region implements the tax-bargaining regime and the other implements the
tax-posting one. Then, in the third stage of the game the tax-posting region,
Rp, chooses the particular level of tax to be imposed on Mi, tp. Finally, in the
fourth stage, when tp is publicly known, Mi shows up and bargains with the
tax-bargaining region, Rb, the amount of tax to be paid in the case of locating
in Rb.8
We begin solving the fourth stage of the game for which we use a standard
Rubinsteins alternating-o¤er bargaining game with outside option (Osborne
and Rubinstein (1990)), where Rb andMi bargain over a pie of size sib = vi gb
(called surplus) and where Mi can opt out and get an outside optionequal to
max (sip   tp; 0).9 That is, Mis outside option is the maximum between what
Mi obtains by locating in Rp and its participation constraint, which requires
Mi not to get a negative payo¤.10 Rb has no outside option.
An agreement (division) of the bargaining game is a pair x = (xRb ; xMi),
in which xk for k = Rb;Mi, is player ks share of the pie. The set of possible
agreements is X = f(xRb ; xMi) 2 R2 : xRb + xMi = 1 and xk  0g. Each player
is concerned only about the payo¤he receives, and prefers to receive more rather
than less.
As in Osborne and Rubinstein we assume that the rst player making an
o¤er is the one without outside option; i.e., Rb in our case. Rb and Mi can take
actions only at times in the (innite) set T = f0; 1; 2; :::g. We assume that Rb
andMi have time preferences with the same constant discount factor  < 1, and
that their payo¤s, in the event thatMi opts out in period t, are (0; 
t(sip  tp)).
At t = 0 Rb proposes a division x of the pie (a member of X).Mi may accept
this proposal, reject it and opt out, or reject it and continue bargaining.11 In
the rst two cases the negotiation ends; in the rst case the payo¤ vector is
8Notice that by now we are not specifying whether Rp or Rb is the favored region.
9 In the bargaining jargon, what a player gets when she takes up her next-best alternative
(what she gets when she opts out) is called the players outside option.
10Hereafter and for simplicity of exposition we use the term payo¤to refer to the ex-post
payo¤and expected payo¤for the ex-ante payo¤.
11Following Osborne and Rubinstein we only allow Mi to opt out and it can only do that
when responding to an o¤er; this ensures uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome. It should
be stressed that this is indeed the standard assumption  see, De Meza and Lockwood (1998)
or Muthoo (1999).
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sibx, and in the second case it is [0;max (sip   tp; 0)]. If Mi rejects the o¤er and
continues bargaining, play passes into the next period, when it is Mis turn to
propose another division, x0; then Rb may accept or reject this division. In the
event of rejection, another period passes, and once again it is Rbs turn to make
an o¤er.
The following lemma states the solution of the bargaining game. It shows
the parameter values12 under which Mi decides to build the new plant in Rb,
Rp or not to come to the country at all. Moreover, the lemma also reveals the
payo¤s for Rb, Rp and Mi as functions of the value tp chosen in the third stage
of the game.
Lemma 2 In the limit as  ! 1 the bargaining game described above gives the
following results, a summary of which are reported in Table 1.
1) Conditions under which Mi locates in Rb or Rp: i) When the
conditions in row Rp and columns 5 and 6 of Table 1 are satised, Mi locates
in Rp and ii) when the conditions in row Rb and columns 5 and 6 of Table 1
are satised, Mi locates in Rb.
2) In case (i) the equilibrium payo¤s functions for Mi, Rp and Rb are
respectively  i;b = sip   tp, ip = tp and ib = 0.
3) In case (ii) the following three cases apply.
3.a) If sip  tp < sib=2 the game has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium,
in which Mi never opts out and agreement is reached immediately on the payo¤
function vector (ib;  i;b) = (sib=2; sib=2) and Rp gets ip = 0.
3.b) If sip  tp > sib=2 the game has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium,
in which Mi never opts out and agreement is reached immediately on the payo¤
function vector (ib;  i;b) = (tp + gp   gb; sip   tp) and Rp gets ip = 0.
3.c) If sip   tp = sib=2 in every sub-game perfect equilibrium the outcome
is an immediate agreement on the payo¤ function vector (ib;  i;b) = (tp+ gp 
gb; sip   tp) and Rp gets ip = 0.
Proof. See appendix A.
The previous lemma was expressed in terms of the playerspayo¤s. However,
a by-product of it is the tax (reaction function) that Rb sets for Mi. It is
obvious that this tax must be such that Mi gets the payo¤ in Table 1. Thus,
the equilibrium tax is:13
tib =
8>>><>>>:
min
 
sib
2 ;
tp + gp   gb)
Rb gets Mi
if

gb  vi & [tp > gb   gp or
(tp = gb   gp & gb  gp)]
0
Rb does not get Mi
if

gb > vi or [tp < gb   gp or
(tp = gb   gp & gb > gp)]:
(5)
The reaction function (5) will be needed in stage 3 of the game in order to
nd Rps equilibrium tax, tp.
12The parameter values obviously refers to vl, vh and q. However, notice that in stages 2,
3 and 4 of the game, g1 and g2 will be parameter values as well. Similarly, we will see bellow
that the tax set by the tax poster in stage 3 becomes a parameter in stage 4. Following this
reasoning it should always be clear what we mean by "parameter values".
13We know that the tax-bargainer is able to set a di¤erent tax on each Mi. Hence, in tib,
the subscript i 8i 2 (l; h) contemplates for that. On the contrary, the posted tax cannot
discriminate between the low and high types and so there is no subscript in tp.
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If the parameter values are such that the conditions in the second curly
bracket of (5) apply, Rb would set a very low tax, tib = 0, in order to lure Mi,
though, it would not be enough to attract it. On the contrary, if the parameter
values are such that the conditions in the rst curly bracket of (5) apply, and
if the outside option is non-binding (i.e., min( sib2 ; tp + gp   gb) = sib2 ) it is
as if the winning region (in this case Rb) takes the entire after-tax rent, sib,
from Mi, but then it compensates Mi by giving back the payo¤ in Table 1,
 i;b = max(
sib
2 ; sip   tp). This guarantees that Mi gets this payo¤. A similar
reasoning applies when the outside option is binding.
Let us move on now to the third stage of the game where we need to nd Rps
equilibrium tax, tp, which together with Table 1 allow us to get Rbs equilibrium
tax, tib, hence the equilibrium expected payo¤s of the sub-game where both
regions implement a di¤erent tax regime can be obtained. In order to carry out
this task two cases have to be considered: a) A sub-game where the favored
region chooses the bargaining regime (i.e., gb  gp);14 we refer to it as the
sub-game (b; p)15 and b) a sub-game where the favored region chooses the tax-
posting regime (i.e., gp < gb); we refer to it as the sub-game (p; b). However,
given assumption 2 and lemma 1, the two cases can be written as:
sub-game (b; p) : gb  min (vl; gp) and gp  vh; (6)
sub-game (p; b) : gp < gb, gp  vl and gb  vh: (7)
In the following lemma we determine both regions equilibrium taxes and
payo¤s for the sub-game (b; p).
Lemma 3 Given (6) (in this case the favored region chooses the bargaining
regime), both regions equilibrium taxes in the sub-game (b; p) are
tp  0 (8)
and
tib = min
sib
2
; tp + gp   gb

; (9)
while the equilibrium regional expected payo¤s are the ones reported in row 1
of Table 4. Notice that, to be consistent with the notation in the following sub-
sections, in row 1 of Table 4 we replace the subscripts b and p by the subscripts
1 and 2.
Proof. See appendix B.
In the sub-game (b; p), sip  sib and so Rb always undercut Rp 8i 2 (l; h).
Notice that in this case Rp must announce a tax even though it knows it will be
unable to both lure the foreign rm away from Rb and receive a non-negative
payo¤  whenever sip  sib,Mi can always approach Rb and strike a negotiated
deal providing Mi the same payo¤ it would get in the other site, sip  tp. Thus,
14Recall that rst the central government decides which one is the favored region and then
the regions decide whether to bargain or to tax-post.
15Notice that we not only need to identify the favored and non-favored regions, but also the
tax regime implemented by each of them. This is the reason why, by now, we are adopting
the notation b and p instead of 1 and 2. However, because the notation b and p does not
specify whether a region is the favored or non-favored one, we rely on the already mentioned
convention that the rst (second) term inside the brackets (i.e., (b; p)) stands for the regime
chosen by the favored (non-favored) region.
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as is clear in row 1 of Table 4, Rp expects to get a zero payo¤. Moreover,
because tp  gb   gp, there is multiple equilibria in the sub-game (b; p), which
is payo¤ equivalent for Rp, but not for Rb. We will comment more on this in
footnote 24.
We have already found the equilibrium taxes and regional payo¤s for the
sub-game where the favored region chooses the bargaining regime (i.e., sub-game
(b; p)), and we move on now to the sub-game where the favored region chooses
the tax-posting one (i.e., sub-game (p; b)). Contrary to what happened in the
previous sub-game, depending on the parameter values, Rp will be the winner
of only Mh or both Mi types. Moreover, the present sub-game is more com-
plex because, in order to maximize its expected payo¤, Rp faces two restricted
maximization problems.16 That is, for all  2 (h or lh), it can maximize its
expected payo¤ restricted to the use of a posted tax, tp , which attracts the set
 of Mi types   i.e., when  = h only type Mh is attracted while when  = lh
both Mi types are attracted.17 These restricted maximization processes result
in two Rps restricted optimal taxes, tp 8 2 (h and lh), and the corresponding
Rbs optimal taxes, tib
18 . With these taxes we can calculate the two vectors
of restricted equilibrium expected payo¤s,

p (p; b) ;

b (p; b)
 8 2 (h and
lh).19
Finally, the restricted equilibrium tax, tp , providing the highest expected
payo¤ to Rp is the sub-games (unrestricted) equilibrium tax for Rp, tp. Once
tp has been obtained, the calculation of the corresponding sub-games regional
equilibrium taxes for Rb, tib, and the vector of payo¤s,

p (p; b) ;

b (p; b)

,
are straightforward. Thus, we rst need to solve the two restricted maximization
problems, which is done in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Given (7) (in this case the favored region chooses the tax-posting
regime), we have that the equilibrium regional expected payo¤s in the sub-game
(p; b) are the ones reported in row 2 of Table 4. Notice that, to be consistent
with the notation in the following sub-sections, in row 2 of Table 4 we replace
the subscripts p and b by the subscripts 1 and 2.
Proof. See appendix C
4 Both regions implement the tax-posting
regime
We know look at the case where in the second stage of the game both regions
have already committed themselves to implement the tax-posting regime; recall
that we refer to it as the sub-game (p; p). Hence, in the third stage of the game
16 It is clear that the attraction of only Ml is a dominated strategy for Rp hence, for the
sake of simplicity, we do not consider it.
17However, keep in mind that in any of these two cases Rp sets a non-discriminatory tax.
Contrast this with the bargaining regime, where the tax paid by the multinational of type i,
tib, depends on its type.
18We recognize that a more appropriate notation for Rbs optimal taxes would have been
tib (p; b) 8 2 (h and lh). This is because, it would make it clear that a particular Rbs tax
is the optimal response to a particular tp , as well as specifying which Mi would be attracted
by Rb. However, for simplicity we prefer to keep the adopted notation.
19Mis payo¤s will not be reported because for our purpose it is enough to know whether
or not Mi goes to a particular region.
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the lower-level governments simultaneously announce non-negotiable taxes and
thenMi chooses the investment site that maximizes its payo¤. This continuation
game entails, in e¤ect, Bertrand-type tax competition between the regions.
The following lemma shows the regional equilibrium expected payo¤s. We
assume g1  g2; i.e., R1 is the favoured region.
Lemma 5 In the sub-game (p; p), R1 and R2 equilibrium expected payo¤s are
the ones reported in row 3 of Table 4, where by denition sij = vi gj 8i 2 (l; h)
and 8j 2 (1; 2).
Proof. See Appendix D.
On the one hand, in the previous lemma we see that under the symmetric
central government tax policy, g1 = g2, the Bertrand competition results in
the local governments competing away the entire surplus, sij = vi   gj , hence
favoring Mi. On the other hand, in the asymmetric case, g1 < g2, the nal
outcome depends more delicately on parameter values. When g2 is relatively
low (i.e., g2  vl) R1 attracts both Mi types and reaps a payo¤ equal to its
competitive advantage. Moreover, it is straightforward to see in row 3 of Table 4
that, given g1  vl, R1s sub-game equilibrium payo¤, which ultimately depends
on whether it intends to attract only Mh type or both Mi types, is weakly
increasing in g2, reecting the fact that a raise in g2 lessens the competition
e¤ect from R2.
5 Both regions implement the tax-bargaining
regime
We know look at the case where in the second stage of the game both regions
have already committed themselves to implement the tax-bargaining regime;
recall that we refer to it as the sub-game (b; b). Hence, the tax paid by Mi in
the host region stems from multilateral bargaining. To model this negotiation
process we adopt the non-cooperative three-party bargaining game developed
by Bolton and Whinston (1993). In our context, this is an alternating-o¤er
game where Mi has to make o¤ers to the two regions.
When it isMis turn to make an o¤er, it can talk with a particular region and
o¤er either a particular tax to be paid to this region in the case of agreement
or it can make no o¤er. When it is the regions turn to make an o¤er, they
simultaneously bid the tax they are willing to charge.
Recall from section 3 that the surpluscreated by Mi in Rj , for i 2 fl; hg
and j 2 f1; 2g is dened as sij = vi   gj . Moreover, as in the previous section,
assume g1  g2; i.e., R1 is the favoured region. Then, the (unique) equilibrium
outcome of the Bolton and Whinston model is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 6 Agreement is immediate, Mi never takes its outside option and its
payo¤ is the maximum between:
1. Half of the surplus it creates in the favoured region, si12 , and
2. Mis outside option, which is equal to the surplus it creates in the non-
favoured region, si2.
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Proof. See Bolton and Whinston (1993).
The results of the Bolton and Whinston bargaining game can also be ex-
pressed in terms of the expected regional payo¤s, which is what we are more
interested in. This is done in the following lemma.
Lemma 7 Given g1  g2, g1  vl (from lemma 1) and g2  vh (from assump-
tion 2), the regional equilibrium expected payo¤s of the sub-game are the ones
reported in row 4 of Table 4.
Proof. The proof is straightforward from lemma 6. When Mi gets si1=2, R1
also gets si1=2 and when Mi gets si2, R1 gets si1   si2 = g2   g1.
In other words, whenever Mis outside option is non-binding, R1 and Mi
share si1 equally. On the contrary, when Mis outside option is binding Mi gets
the value of its outside option whereas R1 is the residual claimant.
6 Central government optimal policy
Before moving on to solve the rst stage of the game let us nd the expected
countrys welfare associated with each of the vectors of payo¤s in Table 4. This
is done in Table 5 by using expression (4) and the fact that Mh and Ml show
up with probabilities q and (1  q). Bear in mind that, as it will become clear
bellow, any expected countrys welfare in Table 5 would only apply if it is
incentive compatible for R1 and R2.
In the rst stage of the game the central government has to nd the value
of (g1; g2) that maximizes the countrys welfare. In order to simplify this task
we make the following claim.
Claim 1 In the equilibrium of the whole game R1 nds it optimal to implement
the tax-bargaining regime.
We show that claim 1 is true at the end of the proof to lemma 8. Now,
based on it we only need to look at the restricted maximization problem where
the central government maximizes the countrys welfare, subject to R1 nding
it optimal to implement the tax-bargaining regime. However, before carrying
out this maximization problem we need to consider a particular issue. Notice
in Table 4 that R2 is indi¤erent between the tax-posting and tax-bargaining
regimes because it always gets a payo¤ of zero. Hence, R2 would choose each
of these regimes with some positive probabilities, say  2 (0; 1) and 1   
respectively. Thus, R1s expected payo¤ from implementing the tax-bargaining
regime is20
e1(b; ) = 1(b; b) + (1  )1(b; p); (10)
where the symbol  indicates that R2 may be playing any tax regime. Notice
that, from the previous sections we know that 1 is R1s expected payo¤ over
the fact that Mi can be of type l or h. Once this expectation has been taken,
e1 is R1s expected payo¤ over the fact that R2, which is indi¤erent between
the two tax regimes, implements each of them with some positive probabilities.
20Notice that we keep the adopted convention of not explicitly writing the regional payo¤
as dependent on the set (g1; g2), even though they do depend on it; i.e., in (10) we write
e1(b; ) instead of e1 (g1; g2; (b; )). However, for the sake of clarity, in (11) we prefer to write
we (g1; g2; (b; )) instead of we (b; ).
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Moreover, using claim 1 we can write the expected countrys welfare as
we (g1; g2; (b; )) = w (g1; g2; (b; b)) + (1  )w (g1; g2; (b; p)) : (11)
For the sake of clarity we will consider the following two scenarios:
Scenario B: vh and the set (g1; g2) are such that sh12  sh2. This means
that, for instance, when both regions implement the tax-bargaining regime,
Mhs outside option is binding.
Scenario N : vh and the set (g1; g2) are such that sh12 > sh2. This means
that, for instance, when both regions implement the tax-bargaining regime,
Mhs outside option is non-binding.
Using (10), (11) and Tables 4 and 5 and given Claim 1, the optimal central
government policy restricted to scenario B is2122
 
gB1 ; g
B
2

= argmax
g1;g2
we (g1; g2; (b; );B) ; (12a)
st : e1 ((b; ) ; B)  e1 ((p; ); B) : (12b)
where, for instance, e1 ((p; ); B) is R1s expected payo¤ from implementing the
tax-posting regime for a particular set (g1; g2) where scenario B applies.
Similarly, using (10), (11) and Tables 4 and 5 and given Claim 1, the optimal
central government policy restricted to scenario N is 
gN1 ; g
N
2

= argmax
g1;g2
we (g1; g2; (b; );N) ; (13a)
st : e1 ((b; ) ; N)  e1 ((p; ); N) : (13b)
Notice that, in a similar fashion we could obtain the optimal central gov-
ernment policy restricted to R1 nding it optimal to implement the tax-posting
regime, say  
gP1 ; g
P
2

= argmax
g1;g2
we (g1; g2; (p; )) ; (14a)
st : e1 ((p; ) ; N)  e1 ((b; ); N) : (14b)
It will become clear later that we do not need to solve this last maximization
problem because it will be enough to show that we
 
gP1 ; g
P
2 ; (p; )

is not higher
than a particular value. In this fashion we will also show that claim 1 is true.
Finally, conditional on claim 1 being true, the unrestricted optimal central
government policy would be the one producing the highest countrys welfare
among the restricted optimal policies obtained in (12) and (13).
21Notice that if (12b) was satised as an equality, the choice of the tax-bargaining regime
would not be R1s unique equilibrium; because R1 would be indi¤erent between both regimes.
However, in the maximization problem (12) we want the tax-bargaining regime to be R1s
unique optimal regime because, as will be clear later, the countrys welfare will be lower if R1
chooses the tax-posting one. One way of achieving this unique equilibrium would be to write
(12b) as a strict inequality. An alternative approach, which is the one adopted here, is to write
(12b) as a weak inequality and adopt the tide break rule that R1 chooses the tax-bargaining
regime with probability one when the restriction binds. This procedure will allow us to avoid
the use of epsilons and so to simplify the notation.
22Given that we already know that R2 is indi¤erent between the two tax regimes, we are
not writing R2s incentive compatibility constraint in (12). Clearly, this constraint is always
satised.
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In the following lemma we obtain the central government optimal policy
restricted to the fact that R1 implements the tax-bargaining regime and scenario
B applies,
 
gB1 ; g
B
2

; moreover, we nd out whether this policy is also a global
optimal one.
Lemma 8 The countrys optimal policy, restricted to the fact that R1 imple-
ments the tax-bargaining regime and scenario B applies, is
 
gB1 ; g
B
2

=

vl;
vh + g1
2

: (15)
Given that R2 is indi¤erent between the two tax regimes, the equilibrium
sub-game is (b; b) if R2 implements the tax-bargaining regime and (b; p) if R2
implements the tax-posting one. However, in both cases the countrys welfare is
the same and equal to:
we
 
gB1 ; g
B
2 ; (b; ); B

= q
vh + vl
2
+ (1  q) vl: (16)
This policy is not welfare dominated by policy
 
gN1 ; g
N
2

(in (13)) and, given
assumption 1, it welfare-dominates policy
 
gP1 ; g
P
2

(in (14)). Thus,
 
gB1 ; g
B
2

is
an(unrestricted) equilibrium policy for the rst stage of the game.
Proof. See appendix E.
Policy
 
gB1 ; g
B
2

is anrather than theequilibrium policy because we do not
know yet whether or not
 
gN1 ; g
N
2

is another unrestricted equilibrium policy.
The following lemma is crucial to elucidate whether or not policy
 
gB1 ; g
B
2

is
the onlyequilibrium of the rst stage of the game.
Lemma 9 Any central government policy where R1 implements the tax-bargaining
regime and scenario N applies, (g1; g2; (b; ) ; N), is welfare dominated and so it
cannot be an optimal one for the country.
Proof. See appendix F.
From lemmas 8 and 9 we get the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Given assumption 1, policy
 
gB1 ; g
B
2

in (15) is the unique global
(unrestricted) equilibrium and the countrys welfare is the one in (16).
Proof. The proof is straightforward from lemmas 8 and 9.
7 Analysis of the results
A clear implication of the proposition 1 is that, as in Parcero (2007), the central
government asymmetric tax treatment of the two identical regions (i.e., the
implementation of policy
 
gB1 ; g
B
2

in (15)) welfare-dominates the symmetric
one. This is the case because, by setting a higher tax in one of the regions the
central government increases the bargaining power of the other region, vis-à-vis
the multinational.
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7.1 The existence of a conict of interests
Proposition 1 leads us to the following question. Why is it the case that policy 
gB1 ; g
B
2

dominates any policy (g1; g2; (b; ) ; N)? The main di¤erence between
the two is that policy
 
gB1 ; g
B
2

makes Mhs outside option binding while any
policy (g1; g2; (b; ) ; N) does not. At rst we would be inclined to think that
making Mhs outside option not to bind (i.e., to make the second region less
competitive) would be welfare improving for the country or at least not welfare
reducing.
In order to have a closer look at this particular result, hereafter we adopt
the notation introduced in page 11 and so tplh (t

ph
) refers to the case where
R1 adopts a tax posting regime with a level of tax attracting both Mi types
(only attracting Mh), while b refers to the case where R1 implements the tax-
bargaining regime.
Recall from the proof to lemma 9 that, for the relevant case where g1 = vl,
a tax g2 >
vh+g1
2 results in R1 not nding it optimal to implement the tax-
bargaining regime. Indeed, in appendix G we additionally show that R1 nds
it optimal to implement tph , which results in a lower countrys welfare than the
case where R1 implements b. Thus, given g1 = vl and g2 >
vh+g1
2 , there is a
conict of interests between the central government (who aims to maximize the
countrys welfare) and the favored region. That is, the tax-bargaining regime is
the optimal one for the former, but tph is the preferred option by the latter.
In order to have a better understanding of this conict of interests let us
look at Figure 2, where g1 = vl and assumption 1 is satised. Figure 2a focuses
on the regional side of the conict of interests by comparing R1s expected
payo¤s from its implementation of tph , b or t

plh
. The thickline indicates R1s
expected payo¤ from implementing tph
23 while the dashed line indicates its
expected payo¤ when implementing b (from row 4 of Table 4).24Notice that
R1s expected payo¤ from implementing tplh is equal to zero and so it coincides
with the horizontal axis.25 We see that when g2 > vh+vl2 , R1 nds it optimal
to implement tph , while when g2  vh+vl2 R1 prefers b.26 Hence the maximum
23To get this expected payo¤ it is easier to look at row 3a of Table 2 and row 3 of Table 3
than looking at Table 4. However, be aware that in Table 2 you should replace the subscripts p
and b by the subscripts 1 and 2. Alternatively, the same expected payo¤ can be obtained from
the second term inside the maximum operator in row 2b (3b) of Table 4 when R2 implements
the tax-bargaining (tax-posting) regime.
24For the interval (vl  g2  vh+vl2 ) in Figure 2a, the dashed line assumes that R2 chooses
the tax-bargaining regime. Hence, R1 payo¤ is 1 (b; b) = q (g2   g1) + (1  q)0 (from row 4
of Table 4).
On the contrary, if R2 implements the tax-posting regime, R1s payo¤ would be equal to
1 (b; p) = q
 
g2   g1 + t2

+ (1   q)0 (from row 1 of Table 4). As we already explained in
page 11, in this case there is more than one equilibrium t2 , subject to inequality (8) being
satised. Hence, R1s payo¤ from implementing the tax-bargaining regime would be on or
above the dashed line in Figure 2a - i.e., triangular area A. However, notice that the fact that
row 1 of Table 4 applies (i.e., area A) would not eliminate the conict of interest; for, the
latter happens when g2 >
vh+vl
2
.
25This is better seen in rows 1 to 2 of Table 3 and rows 1a and 2a of Table 2. Again, be
aware that in Table 2 you should replace the subscripts p and b by the subscripts 1 and 2
(also recall that g1 = vl). Alternatively, the same expected payo¤ can be obtained from the
rst term inside the maximum operator in row 2b (3b) of Table 4 when R2 implements the
tax-bargaining (tax-posting) regime.
26As in footnote 21 we are using the tie break rule that when indi¤erent between the two
tax regimes, R1 chooses the tax-bargaining one with probability one. This tie break rule is
16
value of g2 compatible with R1 implementing b is g2 = vh+vl2 .
Similarly, Figure 2b compares the expected countrys welfare from R1s im-
plementation of tph , b or t

plh
. The thickline indicates the expected countrys
welfare when R1 implements tph ;
27 the dashed line indicates the expected
countrys welfare when R1 implements b (from row 4 of Table 5)28 ; and the
dashed-dotted line indicates the expected countrys welfare when R1 imple-
ments tplh .
29
It is clear in Figure 2 that whenever the outside option for Mhs is non-
binding (i.e. g2 > vh+vl2 ) the conict of interests between the central government
and the winning region appears. That is, the tax-bargaining regime is the
optimal one for the former, but tph is the preferred option by the latter. One
way of looking at this conict of interests is as if the favored region produces
a negative externality to the central government. This is the case because the
two levels of governments share the same tax base, but the local region does not
take the central government payo¤ into account when choosing its tax regime.
Finally, given g1 = vl, from Figures 2a and 2b we get that the unrestricted
maximum countrys welfare is achieved, as stated in proposition 1, when g2 =
vh+vl
2 ; i.e., policy
 
gB1 ; g
B
2

is implemented. Clearly, no conict of interests
exists in this case because the competition from the non-favored region prevents
the favored one from implementing tph and instead drives it to adopt the tax-
bargaining regime; which is the optimal one for the country. Therefore, we can
conclude that the complete elimination of the competition coming from the non-
favoured region is not optimal for the country. In other words, some competition
is desirable, hence the central government tax in the non-favoured region should
not be too high.
Notice that in our setting the conict of interests is created only if the
regions have a choice between the two tax regimes. Hence, there is no conict of
interests when the two regions can only implement the tax-bargaining regime;
see Parcero (2007). Similarly, from row 3 of Tables 4 and 5 we get that the
conict of interests does not appear either if the two regions can only implement
the tax-posting regime. In this last case the expected countrys welfare would be
maximized, for instance, by setting g2 su¢ ciently high and g1 = 0. Under these
taxes the expected countrys welfare would be equal to the favoured regions
expected payo¤, w = 1 + g1 = 

1; hence when the favored region maximizes
its own expected payo¤ it would also be maximizing the expected countrys
welfare.
In what follows we compare the conict of interests with similar results in
two di¤erent pieces of literature. Firstly, there is the result in the concurrent
taxation literature, which stems from two levels of government sharing the same
tax base. The result in question is the fall in the central government tax base as
indicated in Figure 2a by drawing the dashed line marginally above the thick one (for the
interval vl  g2  vh+vl2 ).
27This expected welfare can be obtained from the second term inside the maximum operator
in rows 2b and 3b of Table 5.
28Notice that, as it was the case in footnote 24, the dashed line assumes that, R2 also
chooses the tax-bargaining regime. On the contrary, if R2 chose the tax-posting regime we
would have a situation similar to the one explained in footnote 24 and so the countrys welfare
would be given by the triangular area A. Again, the conict of interests would not be a¤ected.
29This expected countrys welfare can be obtained from the rst term inside the maximum
operator in row 2b (3b) of Table 5 when R2 implements the tax-bargaining (tax-posting)
regime.
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a consequence of a rise in the regional tax rate (a negative vertical externality);
see Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002). In our paper and Keen and Kotsogianniss
one the conict of interests is produced because, from the countrys welfare point
of view, the regional tax is higher than the optimal one. However, the means
by which the countrys welfare loss is produced di¤ers in the two approaches.
On the one hand, in Keen and Kotsogiannispaper this loss is produced by the
fact that there is an over-provision (under-provision) of the regional (central
government) public good; i.e., a misallocation of resources. On the other hand,
the countrys welfare loss in our paper comes from the low appropriation of
foreign rents (i.e., low tax revenues), as a consequence of only attracting the
high type multinational.
Secondly, there is the double marginalization problem as it is known in the
industrial organization literature. This problem appears when a monopolist
upstream rm sells to a monopolist downstream rm by implementing a linear
price; see Tirole (1998). The independent actions of the two rms result in
a nal goods price (in an aggregated prot) which is higher (lower) than the
optimal price (aggregated prot) under vertical integration. However, there are
some di¤erences between our conict of interests and the double marginalization
problem. On the one hand, the latter appears in a situation where both the
upstream and downstream rms post prices and there is no price discrimination
between di¤erent types of buyers. On the other hand, it is well known that the
double marginalization problem can be resolved by vertically integrating the two
monopolies; though, in our setting this vertical integration (which is equivalent
to a change from a federal to a unitarian political system) does not appear to be
an optimal option. This will be shown at the end of the following sub-section.
7.2 Countrys welfare under di¤erent scenarios of regional
autonomy
Let us now look at whether or not some of the following three scenarios are
better than others in terms of countrys welfare. Scenario (i): the regions of
the country can choose between the implementation of the tax-bargaining and
the tax-posting regimes. Scenario (ii): the regions of the country can only
implement the tax-bargaining regime. Scenario (iii): the regions of the country
can only implement the tax-posting regime. We get the following results:
Proposition 2 Firstly, scenarios (i) and (ii) provide the same equilibrium ex-
pected countrys welfare. Secondly, when the attraction of onlyMh is the optimal
countrys policy in each of the three scenarios,30 they produce the same expected
countrys welfare. Thirdly, when the attraction of both Mi types is the optimal
countrys policy under at least one of the three scenarios, scenarios (i) and (ii)
would strictly welfare dominate scenario (iii). Thus, we can conclude that
scenarios (i) and (ii) weaklywelfare dominate scenario (iii).
Proof. In order to prove the proposition we need to identify the equilibrium
expected countrys welfare under each of the three scenarios. First, notice that
whether scenario (i), (ii) or (iii) applies, the maximum expected countrys
welfare restricted to only Mh being attracted is
w(h) = qvh; (17)
30For this to be the case, assumption 1 has to be removed.
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which can be achieved by setting g2 = g1 = vh.
Equilibrium expected countrys welfare under scenario (i): We know
from proposition 1 that the maximum expected countrys welfare under scenario
(i), and when it is optimal for the country to attract both Mi types (i.e., as-
sumption 1 applies), is the one in expression (16). This, together with (17)
results in the equilibrium expected countrys welfare under scenario (i) being
equal to
w(i & ii) = max

q
vh + vl
2
+ (1  q) vl; qvh

: (18)
Equilibrium expected countrys welfare under scenario (ii): The
expected countrys welfare attainable under scenario (ii), and when it is optimal
for the country to attract both Mi types (i.e., assumption 1 applies), is clearly
the one in row 4 of Table 5. (We know that both Mi types would be attracted
because g1  vl). In this case the central government optimal taxes are g1 = vl
and g2  vh+g12 . (This is because the expected countrys welfare in row 4 of
Table 5 is non-decreasing in g2 and, for any g1 < vl and g2  vh+g12 , it is strictly
increasing in g1). Thus, the maximum expected countrys welfare when it is
optimal for the country to attract bothMi types is w = q vh+vl2 +(1  q) vl, which
is equal to the one in (16). This, together with (17) results in the equilibrium
expected countrys welfare under scenario (ii) being equal to the one in (18).
Notice that the rst statement of the proposition is proved.
Equilibrium expected countrys welfare under scenario (iii): The
expected countrys welfare attainable under scenario (iii) is the one in row 3
of Table 5.31 Thus, the optimal central government taxes are 0  g1  vl and
vl < g2  vh,32 which results in the expected countrys welfare
w(iii) = max (vl; qvh) : (19)
Finally, in order to prove the second and third statements of the proposition
we compare the equilibrium expected countrys welfare under scenarios (i) and
(ii), which are identical, with the one in scenario (iii). On the one hand, it
is clear from the second term inside the maximum operators in (18) and (19)
that, when the attraction of only Mh is the optimal countrys policy in each of
the three scenarios, they produce the same expected countrys welfare. On the
other hand, when the attraction of bothMi types is the optimal countrys policy
under scenarios (i) and (ii) (i.e., the rst term inside the maximum operator
in (18) is higher than the second one), any of these scenarios would strictly
welfare dominate scenario (iii). This would be the case whether, under scenario
(iii), it is optimal to attract both Mi types or only Mh; (contrast (19) with the
rst term inside the maximum operator in (18)). Thus, we can conclude that
scenario (iii) is weakly welfare dominated by scenario (i) and (ii).
From the previous proposition we get that scenarios (i) and (ii) provide
the same countrys welfare (given by (18)). However, scenario (i) has a slight
disadvantage with respect to scenario (ii). Because of the existence of the
conict of interests between the central government and the favoured region,
in scenario (i) the central government has to carefully calibrate the tax in the
31Notice that the countrys welfare in row 3 of Table 5 was not a¤ected by assumption 1
and so, whether or not this assumption applies, it may be optimal for the country to attract
both Mi types or just Mh.
32The inequalities 0  g1 and g2  vh come from assumption 2.
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non-favoured region, g2 =
vh+g1
2 in order for the competition exerted by the
latter to be neither too high nor too low. Yet, if the central government gets
this ne-tuning wrong,33 the countrys welfare under scenario (i) would be lower
than the one in expression (18). Hence, scenario (ii) may be slightly preferred
to scenario (i).
Let us now show a policy recommendation that is derived from proposition 2.
Assume a country is characterized by scenario (i) and that, at a particular point
in time, it can decide whether or not to restrict the regional governmentsability
of policy making. In particular, the regional governments can be restricted
from implementing the tax-bargaining or the tax-posting regimes.34 Then, from
proposition 2 we obtain the policy recommendation that it is not optimal for
the country to restrict the regional governments from their ability to choose the
tax-bargaining regime. Furthermore, from the previous paragraph discussion we
also obtain that it may be optimal to restrict the regional ability of implementing
the tax-posting regime. Though, this last result is weaker than the rst one.
Notice that, if the regional governments were restricted from the implemen-
tation of both tax regimes, the taxation of multinationals would become the
exclusive responsibility of the central government (we move from a federal to a
unitarian political system). Given that the central government posts its taxes,
it is easy to see that this last scenario would provide the same countrys welfare
as scenario (iii), which is welfare dominated (from proposition 2).
Finally, let us take a moment to reconsider the appropriateness of our as-
sumption that the central government can only implement tax-posting and not
tax-bargaining. On the one hand, notice that if the central government imple-
ments a tax-bargaining when the regions cannot implement any tax regime, it
would result in a lower countrys welfare than scenario (ii). This is the case
because, under scenario (ii) the country is implementing a bargaining-with-
reservation-tax regime35 , which provides a higher aggregate payo¤ (countrys
welfare) than a simple bargaining regime. In particular, the bargaining-with-
reservation-tax regimeadvantages the bargaining regimein that the favoured
region bargains over a surplus from which a non-negotiable reservation tax
is taken by the central government. On the other hand, my conjecture is
that the central government implementation of tax-bargaining would also be
welfare dominated in other scenarios; besides it would be very di¢ cult to be
modelled as well (in particular in the case that the regions also implement tax-
bargaining). Anyhow, the consideration of the central government implementing
tax-bargaining could be a matter for future research.
8 Conclusion
This paper has looked at a countrys central government optimal policy in a
setting where its local regions compete for the attraction of a footloose multi-
national to their sites, and where the considered multinational strictly prefers
this country to the rest of the world. For the sake of reality we have built a
33Though, the mechanism through which this could happen is not explicitly modeled in our
paper.
34This may be done, at least to some extent, at a stage of constitutional change or, perhaps,
by the passing of a federal law.
35 In a di¤erent context, this bargaining regime is referred by Wang (1995) as bargaining
with reservation price, which revenue dominates a simple bargaining.
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model where the regions were allowed to choose between the implementation
of rm-specic and non-rm-specic policies. As proxies for these two types of
policies the tax-bargainingand tax-postingregimes were used.
As in Parcero (2007) we have found that the central government asymmetric
tax treatment of the two identical regions welfare-dominates the symmetric one.
In other words, it is optimal for the central government to set a high enough tax
in one of the regions (the non-favoured one) in order to increase the bargaining
power of the other (favoured) region, vis-à-vis the multinational.
We also found that, under some parameter constellations, if the tax in the
non-favoured region is too high, a conict of interests is created between the cen-
tral government of the country and the favoured region. That is, the central gov-
ernment would prefer the favoured region implements the tax-bargaining regime
(attracting both types of multinationals), but this region nds it optimal to im-
plement the tax-posting regime (only attracting the high rent multinational).
Interestingly, this conict of interests is avoided by a calibrated reduction in
the central government tax in the non-favoured region. Thus, some regional tax
competition is desirable, hence the central government tax in the non-favoured
region should not be too high. The reason for this result is that a certain degree
of competition from the non-favoured region drives the favoured one to adopt
the tax-bargaining regime, which is the optimal one for the country.
We have also shown that the implementation of the regional tax-bargaining
regime weakly welfare dominates the implementation of the regional tax-posting
regime. Consequently, in the case that our choice of proxies for the policys rm-
specicity degrees were an appropriate simplication of the reality, our papers
advice would be against the banning of the regional implementation of rm-
specic policies. Moreover, if a country had to (and had the capacity to) restrict
the regional ability of policy making in some way, our paper would advocate the
restriction of the non-rm-specic policies, rather than the rm-specic ones.
Finally, by focusing on the taxation side, this paper has only looked at
one aspect of the regional policys rm-specicity degree. Further research is
needed in order to consider other aspects. For instance, when the policys rm-
specicity is in terms of regional infrastructure provision instead of taxation.
That is, whether the infrastructure is built in advance or after a particular
multinational shows up; the latter allowing the infrastructure to be more tailor
made. Perhaps the main di¤erence of this alternative approach would be that
it increases the rents created by the di¤erent types of multinationals.
9 Appendix
A
In what follows we sequentially prove points (1) to (3).
Point 1) Let us rst explain the fact that when gb  vi and tp > gb gp,Mi
locates in Rb and when tp  sip and tp < gb   gp, Mi locates in Rp (columns 5
and 6 of Table 1). On the one hand, the inequalities gb  vi and tp  sip stand
for Mis participation constraints in Rb and Rp respectively. Notice that, for
simplicity, when gb = si (tp = sip) we are imposing the tie break rule that Mi
prefers to locate in Rb (Rp) rather than not to come to the country at all. On
the other hand, inequality tp < gb   gp (respectively tp > gb   gp) is equivalent
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to sib < sip   tp, which compares the surplus produced in the match between
Mi and Rb with the value of Mis outside option in Rp.
Furthermore, notice that in row Rb (row Rp) and column 6 of Table 1 we
are also using the tie break rules that when tp = gb  gp & gb  gp (respectively
tp = gb gp & gb > gp)Mi prefers Rb to Rp (Rp to Rb). The necessity of the rst
(respectively second) tie break rule will be clear in lemma 3 bellow (respectively
in expressions (20) and (22) bellow).
Point 2) In this case Mi locates in Rp because Rb is unable to both lure
the foreign rm away from Rp and receive a non-negative payo¤. From (2)Mis
payo¤ is equal to the rent it produces minus the aggregate taxes (gp + tp) it
pays while Rps payo¤ is the tax it charges. Rb is the loosing region and gets
nothing. See row Rb of Table 1.
Point 3) The proof of this point is straightforward from section 3.12.1 in
Osborne and Rubinstein (1990). Notice that in point (3.b) and (3.c) Mi gets
its outside option,  i;b = sip   tp, and Rbs payo¤ is calculated as follows:
sib    i;b = tp + gp   gb.
B
Let us rst show that tp  0. Given gb  gp, it is clear from row Rp of Table 1
that whenever tp < gb gp and tp  sip, Rp would attractMi (at a loss because
ip = tp < 0) while whenever tp  gb   gp or tp > sip, Rp would not attract
Mi.
Notice that, given that (6) implies gb  vl, we can be certain that gb gp  sip
8i 2 (l; h). Hence, the previous paragraph results simplify to: Whenever tp <
gb   gp, Rp would attract both Mi types at a loss while whenever tp  gb   gp,
Rp would not attract any Mi type. However, notice that if gb  gp  tp < 0, Rp
would get an expected loss if Rb plays an o¤-the-equilibrium tax higher than
the equilibrium one. That is,
p = qtp + (1  q) tp = tp < 0:
Then, tp < 0 would be a weakly dominated strategy for Rp. Hence, by ignoring
weakly dominated strategies (see, e.g., Kreps 1990, ch. 12) Rps equilibrium tax
is tp  0.
Finally, given tp  0 and (6), we get that Rbs equilibrium tax (from the
rst row of (5)) is tib = min
 
sib
2 ; t

p + gp   gb

while Rbs equilibrium expected
payo¤ (by using the ex-post payo¤ function from the third column of Table 1)
are the ones reported in row 1 of Table 4. Notice that, to be consistent with
the notation in the following sub-sections, in row 1 of Table 4 we replace the
subscripts b and p by the subscripts 1 and 2; moreover, we are including the
restrictions imposed by assumption 2 and lemma 1.
C
The proof proceeds as follows. First, given (7), we determine each local equilib-
rium tax-posters tax tp 8 2 (h and lh). Second, for each local equilibrium and
using (5) we get the corresponding tib. Third, for each local equilibrium we get
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(by using Table 1) the corresponding vector of payo¤s,

p (p; b) ;

b (p; b)

.
Finally, the sub-games equilibrium expected payo¤s for Rp and Rb are obtained.
We have the following two local equilibria:
Local equilibrium 1: Rp attracts both Mi types (rows 1a to 2b of
Table 2): Given (7), from Table 1 we get that Rp would attract both Mi types
if
tp  min [(gb   gp; vh   gp) ; (gb   gp; vl   gp)] (20)
which, given assumption 2, is equivalent to
tp  min (gb   gp; vl   gp) : (21)
Thus, tplh (from (21)), 

plh
(plh; b) (from Table 1) as well as the parameter
values under which they apply (using assumption 2 and lemma 1) are shown: i)
In row 1a of Table 2 when in (21) min(gb   gp; vl   gp) = gb   gp (i.e., gb  vl)
and ii) in row 2a of Table 2 when min(gb   gp; vl   gp) = vl   gp (i.e., vl < gb).
Let us now move on to nd the corresponding values of tib and 

b (plh; b).
On the one hand, given tplh = gb   gp and gp < gb from row 1a of Table 2, it
is clear from (5) that when Mi shows up tib = 0; hence using Table 1 we get
b (plh; b) = 0 (see row 1b of Table 2). On the other hand, given t

plh
= vl   gp
and vl < gb from row 2a of Table 2, we know from (5) that when Mi shows up
tib = 0 as well; hence using Table 1 we get 

b (plh; b) = 0 (see row 2b of Table
2).
Local equilibrium 2: Rp attracts only Mh (rows 3a and 3b of Table
2): Given (7), from Table 1 we get that Rp would only attract Mh if
min (gb   gp; vl   gp) < tp  min (gb   gp; vh   gp) : (22)
Given assumption 2, the previous inequality is equivalent to
min (gb   gp; vl   gp) < tp  gb   gp; (23)
which is satised if and only if vl < gb. Then, if vl < gb, it is obvious that tph
(from (23)), ph (ph; b) (from Table 1) as well as the parameter values under
which they apply (using assumption 2 and lemma 1) are the ones in row 3a of
Table 2. Finally, given tph = gb   gp and gp < gb, it is clear that tib (from (5))
and b (ph; b) (from Table 1) are the ones in row 3b of Table 2.
Finally, the sub-games equilibrium expected payo¤s for Rp and Rb are re-
ported in row 2 of Table 4. Notice that, to be consistent with the notation in
the following sub-sections, in row 2 of Table 4 we replace the subscripts p and
b by the subscripts 1 and 2.
D
Given assumption 2, lemma 1 and the fact that R1 is the favoured region, we
have that g1  min (g2; vl) and g2  vh. Hence we know from (1) that for R1
to get Mi it is necessary that Mis payo¤ is higher in R1 than in R2 and that
Mi participation constraint is satised. This requires that36
t1  min (t2 + g2   g1; si1) for i 2 (l; h) ; (24)
36For simplicity, in this section we use the tie break rule that in the case of being indi¤erent
between R1 and R2 or not coming to the country at all, Mi locates in R1 with probability 1.
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where by denition si1 = vi   g1 8i 2 (l; h).
Notice that in the sub-game (p; p) it can never be the case that both Mi
types go to di¤erent regions. This, together with g1 < g2 guarantees that R2
will not get any Mi type in equilibrium.
Let us see what is R2s equilibrium tax. Notice that a tax t2 < 0 would be
a weakly dominated strategy for R2.37 Hence, by ignoring weakly dominated
strategies (see, e.g., Kreps 1990, ch. 12) and given the fact that R1 would nd
it optimal to undercut any tax t2 > 0, R2s equilibrium tax is
t2 = 0: (25)
Then, replacing t2 from (25) into (24) for i = l we get that in order for R1 to
get Ml it is necessary that
t1l 

g2   g1 if g2  vl
sl1 if vl < g2:
(26)
Similarly, replacing t2 from (25) into (24) for i = h we get that in order for R1
to get Mh it is necessary that
t1h 

g2   g1 if g2  vh
sh1 if vh < g2:
(27)
Furthermore, using (3) and knowing thatMh (Ml) shows up with probability
q (1  q), R1s equilibrium expected payo¤ when it attracts both Mi types and
when it attracts onlyMh are respectively given by the following two expressions
1 (plh; p) = t1 (28a)
1 (ph; p) = qt1: (28b)
Notice that when vl < g2 we know that sl1 < g2 g1; hence a tax t1 = g2 g1
would only attract Mh. Furthermore, given assumption 2, the second row in
(27) does not need to be considered. This is not a problem because, given
g2 = vh, the tax in the rst row of (27) is exactly the same as the one in the
second row. Thus, from (26), (27) and (28) we get that R1s equilibrium taxes
(expected payo¤s) are the ones reported in the rst (second) column of Table 3;
the parameter values under which each of the equilibria applies are in the third
column.38 Needless to say that R2 gets an expected payo¤ of zero. Finally, it
is clear that the case where the central government sets the same tax in both
regions is g1 = g2  vl (by using lemma 1); this case is contemplated in row 1
of Table 3.
Let us now show that, the set of taxes t2 = 0 and t

1 in Table 3 are the
unique Nash equilibriums for the corresponding parameter values in the third
column of Table 3. We know that t2 < t2 is a weakly dominated strategy for
R2 (see, e.g., Kreps 1990, ch. 12). This leaves us with only four possibilities:
(t1 > t

1; t2  t2), (t1  t1; t2 > t2), (t1 < t1; t2  t2) and (t1  t1; t2 > t2).
However, on the one hand, (t1 > t1; t2  t2) and (t1  t1; t2 > t2) are not
37That is, t2 < 0 would give R2 an expected lost if R1 plays an o¤-the-equilibrium tax
resulting in R2 defeating R1.
38Notice that assumption 2 and lemma 1 are imposed in the third column. Moreover, the
second condition appearing in the last two rows of Table 3 refer to 1(plh; p) R 1(ph; p).
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equilibrium because both regions will have incentives to undercut each other
until (t1 = t1; t2 = t

2) is achieved. On the other hand, (t1 < t

1; t2  t2) and
(t1  t1; t2 > t2) are not equilibrium. This is because, given t2  t2, t1 = t1
provides a higher expected payo¤ to R1 than t1 < t1 while , given t1 = t

1,
t2 = t

2 provides R2 a higher payo¤ than t2 > t

2. Thus, the only equilibrium is
(t1 = t

1; t

2 = 0).
Finally, the expected regional payo¤s in Table 3 are summarized in row 3 of
Table 4.
E
It is clear in rows 1 and 4 of Table 5 that w (g1; g2; (b; )) is weakly increasing
in g1 and g2. Hence, given scenario B and if R1s incentive compatibility was
not a problem (i.e., (12b) was satised), it would be optimal in (12a) to set
g1 and g2 in their maximum values subject to lemma 1 and scenario B   i.e., 
gB1 ; g
B
2

=
 
vl;
vh+g1
2

. Indeed, R1s incentive compatibility is guaranteed by
this set of taxes; this is because, by using (10) and Table 4 it is straightforward
to see that (12b) is satised.39 Thus, from (12a) we get that the countrys
optimal policy, restricted to R1 implementing the tax-bargaining regime and to
scenario B, is the one in (15). Hence, from (11) and rows 1 and 4 of Table 5 we
get that the expected countrys welfare is the one in (16).
Furthermore, the restricted optimal policy (15) is unique because, as stated
in the previous paragraph, w (g1; g2; (b; )) is weakly increasing in g1 and g2.
Hence we (g01; g
0
2; (b; ); B) < we
 
gB1 ; g
B
2 ; (b; ); B
 8 (g01; g02) <  gB1 ; gB2 .
Finally, let us show that the restricted optimal policy
 
gB1 ; g
B
2

becomes an
equilibrium policy for the rst stage of the game. The following inequality is
required
we
 
gB1 ; g
B
2 ; (b; ); B
  maxwe  gN1 ; gN2 ; (b; ); N ; we  gP1 ; gP2 ; (p; )	 : (29)
In order to prove that inequality (29) is satised it is enough to show that
we
 
gN1 ; g
N
2 ; (b; ); N

and we
 
gP1 ; g
P
2 ; (p; )

cannot be higher than particular
values, which we now proceed to nd. From (11), lemma 1 and rows 1 and 4
(rows 2 to 3) of Table 5 respectively, it is clear that 40
we
 
gN1 ; g
N
2 ; (b; ); N

 q
vh + vl
2
+ (1  q) vl; (30)
we
 
gP1 ; g
P
2 ; (p; )

 max fvl; qvhg : (31)
Hence, from (16) and (30) we get
we
 
gB1 ; g
B
2 ; (b; ); B

 we
 
gN1 ; g
N
2 ; (b; ); N

(32)
while, given assumption 1, from (16) and (31) we get
we
 
gB1 ; g
B
2 ; (b; ); B

> we
 
gP1 ; g
P
2 ; (p; )

: (33)
Thus, as stated in this proposition, inequality (32) implies that policy
 
gB1 ; g
B
2

is not welfare dominated by policy
 
gN1 ; g
N
2

while inequality (33) implies that
39See note for the referees provided in a separate le.
40We use  instead of  because, at this stage, we do not know whether or not it can be
satised as an equality.
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policy
 
gB1 ; g
B
2

welfare-dominates policy
 
gP1 ; g
P
2

. Hence, the restricted opti-
mal policy
 
gB1 ; g
B
2

is anequilibrium policy for the rst stage of the game.
Moreover, from the last two sentences we conclude that claim 1 is true.
F
If the regional incentive compatibility was not a problem (i.e., (13b) was satis-
ed), the expected countrys welfare would be equal to (using (11), lemma 1 as
well as rows 1 and 4 of Table 5):
we (g1; g2; (b; ); N) = q vh + g1
2
+ (1  q) vl + g1
2
: (34)
It is clear that when g1 < vl, the expected countrys welfare in (34) is lower
than the one in (16), and both are equal when g1 = vl. Thus, if there were a
case where a tax policy (g1; g2; (b; ) ; N) is not welfare dominated, it must be
when g1 = vl. Let us write this particular policy as
(g01; g
0
2; (b; ) ; N) =

g1 = vl, g2 >
vh + g1
2

: (35)
However, under scenario N and with g1 = vl, the tax-bargaining regime is
not incentive compatible for R1 (i.e., inequality (13b) is not satised) and so
it cannot be an equilibrium regime for the country. Notice that, given (35)
and whether R2 implements the tax-bargaining or the tax-posting regime, for
inequality (13b) to be satised it is necessary that (using (10) as well as rows
1, 4 and 2b of Table 4)41
q
sh
2
+ (1  q) sl
2
 q (g2   g1) : (36)
Then, in order to show that inequality (13b) does not apply it is enough to
prove that inequality (36) is not satised. Replacing g2 >
vh+g1
2 (from (35))
by g2 =
vh+g1
2 +  for  > 0 in (36) and given g1 = vl, we nd that (36) is
equivalent to  < 0, which obviously does not hold.
Thus, we have just shown that, given g1 = vl, R1 would not nd it optimal
to implement the tax-bargaining regime; hence any tax policy (g1; g2; (b; ) ; N)
provides a lower countrys welfare than policy
 
gB1 ; g
B
2

.
G
We already know from lemma 9 that, given (35), R1 prefers the tax-posting
regime to the tax-bargaining one. Let us now be more specic and show that
R1 would choose tph instead of t

plh
. From (35) we get that g2 > vl; hence in
order for R1 to choose tph instead of t

plh
it is required that (from rows 2a and
3a of Table 2 if R2 implements the tax-bargaining regime and from rows 2 and
3 of Table 3 if R2 implements the tax-posting regime),
q (g2   g1) > sl1: (37)
which, given (35), clearly applies.
41Notice that from (35) we get vl < g2, as required by the conditions in row 2b of Table 4.
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t = 1 t = 2 t = 4
Regions choose 
the “local” tax 
regimes towards 
multinationals.
(i.e., ‘bargaining’
or ‘tax posting’)
Mi (i = h, l) chooses 
location and pays       
gj + tj (j=1, 2); where   
tj is the result of 
‘bargaining’ or a 
‘posted tax’. 
Alternatively, it does 
not locate in the 
country.
Figure 1: Sequence of events
All parties 
collect their 
respective 
payoffs.
We allow for the M’s type to be ex-post observable, but non-
verifiable in a court of law. Thus, taxes cannot be made 
contingent on types when tax posting is used.
G announces the 
“national” taxes 
(g1 and g2) to be 
paid by Mi in
each region.
t = 3
Chosen tax 
regimes are 
publicly observed
Posted taxes 
(t1, t2) (if any) 
are 
simultaneously 
set
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Figure 2: Conflict of interests between the central  
          government and the favored region 
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Table 4: Regional expected equilibrium payo¤s for all the sub-games
Regional expected equilibrium payo¤s for each sub-game(1)
1

e1 (b; p)
e2 (b; p)

=

qmin
 
sh1
2 ; g2   g1 + t2

+ (1  q)min   sl12 ; g2   g1 + t2
0

2

e1 (p; b)
e2 (p; b)

=
8>>>><>>>>:

g2   g1
0

if g1  g2  vl (a)
max (sl1; q (g2   g1))
0

if g1  vl < g2 (b)
3

e1 (p; p)
e2 (p; p)

=
8>>>><>>>>:

g2   g1
0

if g1  g2  vl (a)
max (sl1; q (g2   g1))
0

if g1  vl < g2 (b)
4

e1 (b; b)
e2 (b; b)

=

qmin
 
sh1
2 ; g2   g1

+ (1  q)min   sl12 ; g2   g1
0

Table 5: Expected equilibrium countrys welfare for all the sub-games
Expected equilibrium countrys welfare for each sub-game(1)
1 we (b; p) = qmin
 
vh+g1
2 ; g2 + t

2

+ (1  q)min   vl+g12 ; g2 + t2
2 we (p; b) =
8<: g2 if g1  g2  vl (a)max (vl; qg2) if g1  vl < g2 (b)
3 we (p; p)=
8<: g2 if g1  g2  vl (a)max (vl; qg2) if g1  vl < g2 (b)
4 we (b; b) = qmin
 
vh+g1
2 ; g2

+ (1  q)min   vl+g12 ; g2
(1): Notice that 0  g1  vh and 0  g2  vh (from assumption 2), g1  vl
(from lemma 1), and tp  0 (from lemma 3). Recall also that g1  g2.
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